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Niyibizi: The Demobilization Process in Burundi

The objective of the current ingando is to allow

the latter was demobilizing 27.340 soldiers

participants, soldiers or civilians. to go beyond

This process has continued up to date. The

,the feelings of fear and mutual suspicion and

country has received dividends from the

speak freely about. the conflict which opposes

security climate as a result of this policy of

:them. to heal the wounds, to accept responsi-

military integration. It has allowed to efficiently

bilities in case harm was done. to demystifY the

fight against uprising of infiltrated elements by

negative perceptions of one towards the other,

cutting ex-RAF and militias from their supply

to assume collectively the consequences of the

base, since integrated soldiers had become

common tragedy and agree on the common

citizens who wanted to protect their families.

future. Ingando is based on the approach of

Besides. these soldiers, once demobilized.

problem resolution, which encourages the

transformed

participants to analyze their conflict. its causes,

economic development and reconciliation.

themselves

into

actors

of

and attitudes of one towards the other and
post-conflict relationships.

Military integration is an important element in
the process of reconciliation and restoration of

Within the framework of military integration,

sustainable peace. The success depends on the

this methodology comprises four phases. The

political and military leadership will, on its

first phase allows RDF soldiers and ex-combat-

insertion at grassroots level and its ownership

ants to speak out about history and origin of

by communities. International partners will

the conflict. with the aim of removing barriers

back up local initiatives but the latter do not

which prevented them from communicating.

belong to them. Finally, in the perspective of

The second phase consists of appointing the

reconciliation. ex-combatants should also be

former opponents to various posts. By working

considered as "victims" of the conflict and

together they continue their discussions about

consequently losers as well.

the conflict and establish close relations.
During the third stage, participants are

The experience of military integration carried

encouraged to analyze the conflict as a common

out by RDF produced a new example of an inte-

problem with shared losses and responsibili-

grated institution. It has allowed also to ensure

ties. This is done not to utter blames but to

security in _the country and to propose a new

analyze the conflict so as to prevent it from

model of the culture of unity and hope as

occurring again in future. During the fourth

opposed to the culture of hatred and despair.

stage. ex-combatants appraise all the process.
*************
Ingando is the beginning of the resolution of the

conflict. The challenge is to always b capable of

The demobilization process in Burundi,

ensuring an atmosphere which allows mutual

by Col. Isate NIYIBIZI

respect, recognition of dignity and humanity of
each participant.

A historical reminder of the major events which
occurred before this process is necessary to

Between

1995

and

49.700

understand the national program for demobi-

ex-combatants were integrated into RDF. while

lization and reintegration (PNRR) in Burundi.
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The victory of the · Front for Democracy. in

The process had to go through different phases:

Burundi (FRODEBU) during the elections held

confinement, checking, registration, question-

in June 1933 was followed by the assassination

naire on expectations, orientation before the

of the elected President M. Ndadaye. That act

departure,

was at the origin of the creation, early 1994, of

screening for HIV I AIDS, distribution of depar-

the National Council for the Defense of

ture package (9-month salary, the remaining 9

Democracy (CNDD) and the Forces for the

months to be paid in 3 installments after an

Defense of Democracy (FDD). The launching of

interval of 3 months) and transport expenses to

demobilization operations

the provinces of destination.

started on

1st

medical

screening,

voluntary

December 2004 after the Global Accord of
Cease-fire which was signed between CNDD-

The guiding principles of reintegration are as

FDD and the transitional government on 16

follows : the adult demobilized receive the

Novembei· 2003.

same level of assistance (about US$600) supplied in kind. each ex-combatant chooses

Demobilization concerned both the Burundian

him/herself his/her location for reintegration

Army Forces (FAB) and the combatants from

and his/her activity.

Parties and armed political Movements. The cri-

assistance for ex-child soldiers and handi-

teria which were considered were: voluntary

capped ex-combatants. The programme fore-

service, physical condition, age, discipline, edu-

sees projects of general interest for resettlement

cation level, cost of defense and security corps.

communities. Five options were suggested:

An organ in charge of socio-professional reinte-

vocational training, formal education, income-

gration of the demobilized had to be set up. And

generating activities. entrepreneurship and

each demobilized person had to receive a demo-

employment promotion.

PNDRR provides special

bilization allowance. In total, 80,000 persons
from the target groups were concerned plus

In May 2007. the total number of the demobi-

20,000 gardiens de la paix and 10,000 activist

lized amounted to 20,929 (out of 55,000 expect-

combatants. But. in reality, the total number of

ed). The biggest number of them comes from

persons to be demobilized amounted to about

FAB (7.347). CNDD-FDD (7.050) and the

55.000.

National Defense Forces (2.859). The gaps
could be explained by three factors: the figures

The fund had to be provided, in order of impor-

inflated

by

negotiating

parties,

tance, by the Fiduciary Fund MDRP (1st donor)

recruitment by some armed movements during

or the program for demobilization and reinte-

the cantonment period and the difficulties of

gration of ex-combatants from seven countries

reintegration

of the Great Lakes region (Angola, Burundi,

being the only ones to offer real opportunities to

Uganda, CAR, DRC. Congo, Rwanda), the World

the demobilized).

(income-generating

on-going

activities

Bank and Germany. The total cost was estimated at US$ 84,4 millions : the average cost per

Returning to civilian life for tens of thousands

beneficiary being 1,325 US$.

of combatants and militia men has undeniably
improved security in the country. Displaced
persons and
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returned home. And the demobilized constitute,
even though they are ill-prepared for that. a
labour forc e which cannot be negl ec ted .

sectors.
As regards elections, the country has known a
long experience of elections which were wt> ll

However, the delay in effective implementation
of the cease-fire signed be tween the government
and Rwasa's FNL constitutes a real danger.
The process of d emobilization is still going on.
It ·is the reason why it is difficult to appreciate

all its results. However. the tendency shows
clen rly that economic objectives will not be
achieved in short or mid-term. On the other
h<mcl. objectives wh ich had not been identified

during the con ception of the program but which
are vital for the reconciliation of Burundians
havt' been attained: demobilization has a llowed
integra tion of the armed political Movements
and the Burundian Armed forces into the
Nationa l Defense Forces. Let us not forget that

conducted within the framework of a single

it is exclusion or its percep tion which ran -

party system as well as in the multiparty sys-

sacked and pillaged this country for a lmost h<1lf

tem . Parliamentary and presidential elections

a century.

have been taking place since 1992. The quality
of these elections improved at every tenn.

*********************

excE'pt in Zanzibar. For the observers. those of
THEME IV: ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL

2002 were free but not fair: in 2005 they were
free and fair. From the changes that occurred.

PROCESSES

one could mention the number of voters which
Elections

et

challenges

to

the

kept increasing (8.93 million in 1995. 10.09

Democratization process in Tanzania. The

million in 2000 and 16,42 million in 2005).

interface between administrative reforms

what is a sign of a greater awaren ess for the

and democratization, by Jonas Ewald

political participation on the part of the
population.

Tanzania is an interesting example of conflict
resolution in the Great Lakes region because it
has developed a political culture of peaceful
development. in a context of great poverty.
Tanzania has a strong identity and nationa l
cohesion: it is also a mong the countries which
are registering the best performances at the
level of the African continent in the areas of
governance. reforms in economic and public

Since 1995, the party in power, Chama Cha
Mapinduzi (CCM) has won elections with an
ever more comfortable lead over the opposition ·
(61,8 % in 1995 . 71,7 % in 2000 and 80,3 % in
2005). In 1995. the opposition had 46 seats:
this number dropped to 26 in 2005. whose 19
were from Zanzibar islands and especially
Pemba.
The challenges

faced

by the process

of
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